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Abstract. This study examines the effect of quality of institutions on economic growth in 
five East African countries using panel data for the period spanning from1996 to 2015. 
Fixed effects (FE) and random effects (RE) models were employed for estimation. Using 
Hausman test, FE was earmarked to be more appropriate model for this study. The 
empirical findings show that the quality of institution significantly impacts on economic 
growth. Political stability, government effectiveness, rule of law and control of corruption 
in particular are significant variables. Regulatory quality, voice and accountability indicate 
insignificant effect on growth. The results suggest that governance that promotes strong 
institutions is an important condition for economic growth. Particular focus should be 
focused on enhancing political stability, government effectiveness, rule of law and control 
of corruption so as to attain economic development.  
Keywords. Institutional quality, Economic growth, East Africa, Fixed effects. 
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1. Introduction 
conomic literature argue that, the rate of economic growth of a country is 
basically explained by resource endowment and technology. The 
determinants of economic growth and development can be traced back to the 
neoclassical model in 1950s (Solow, 1956; Swan, 1956). The standard neoclassical 
growth model identifies capital accumulation or investment as the central factor in 
explaining levels of per capita income. Most of these models focus primarily on the 
basic factors of production. In this case, factors of production like capital stock, 
labour force and level of technology needed to produce aggregate level of output 
determine the level of growth. The basic idea is that, output is influenced by the 
level of capital stock a country have and how many people work and how 
productive they are. Essentially, labour productivity in this case depends on the 
level of education and the general health of the population. It is also argued that a 
country that can develop and adapt to new technologies more quickly than others 
are likely to grow quickly. 
In spite of different models explaining how different inputs can be combined to 
produce output; further analysis show that growth models hitherto fail to answer 
truly causal questions. Even if capital accumulation or technological innovation 
accounts for significant differences in long-run levels of per capita output across 
countries, the question remains why certain societies succeeded while others failed 
to take the actions necessary to accomplish such accumulation or innovation. 
In trying to explain the causes of differences in growth among countries, 
Acemoglu et al., (2005) used the role of institutions between two countries (South 
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Korea and North Korea) to explain its impact on economic growth. The two 
countries at the end of the Second World War actually differed little in terms of 
economic endowments or structure. The main difference has been in terms of 
subsequent choices in terms of institutional organization. South Korea maintained a 
system of private property and an economic model based on private incentives and 
market forces. South Korea thus followed the path of inclusive institutions and 
prospered, turning into one of the ‘Asian economic miracles’ in the 1960s. North 
Korea in contrast followed the communist model in abolishing private property and 
installing a centrally planned economy. The North Korean regime chose extractive 
institutions and has seen its economy lag that of its southern neighbour since, even 
falling back in terms of absolute economic welfare since the 1990s. This case 
clearly supports the view that institutional quality is an essential element in the 
enabling environment that drives long term economic progress. 
Similarly, an enormous empirical studies on the relationship between 
institutional quality and economic growth support the view that institutional quality 
matters for economic growth and development (Acemoglu et al., 2001; 2002; 2003; 
2005, Easterly & Levine, 2001; Dollar & Kraay, 2003; Hall & Jones, 1999; Rodrik 
et al., 2004; Rodrik et al., 2002; Rodrik, 1999; Knack & Keefer, 1995; Mauro, 
1995; Rodrik, Subramanian & Trebbi, 2004; Siddique & Ahmed, 2009; and Lee & 
Kim, 2009). According to this view, government policies influence economic 
output by affecting the allocation of economic resources and creating the incentives 
to use the factors of production in different ways. In particular, it has been found 
that there is a major role that is played by institutions in influencing the effects of 
either the human or physical capital or both in influencing the growth path of 
economies.  
This paper examines institutional quality and how it impacts on economic 
growth. The findings from this study expects to contribute to the on - going debate 
over the institutions – growth linkage particularly for developing countries. The 
remainder of this paper is structured as follows: section 2 provides a review of 
literature and section 3 gives the description of the methodology and data used in 
the study. Section 4 shows analysis of findings before we conclude and provides 
avenues for further research.  
 
2. Review of literature 
2.1. Theoretical approach 
North, (1990) argue that institutions set market rules, structure interactions 
among economic actors and ensure that economic actions are bounded by these 
rules. In this view, firms are encouraged in an environment protected by market 
rules as a result competition often leads to technological upgrading, innovation and 
productivity gains. According to Romer, (1986) knowledge is an important input 
that has the properties of increasing the return to scale. Indeed, if knowledge is 
central to potential increasing to scale in production and therefore economic 
growth; good institutions are required to reduce the uncertainty inherent in 
economic interactions by making information more readily available and the 
behavior of actors become predictable. They also provide protection of the 
intellectual properties of individual entrepreneurs and inventors. On the other hand 
bad institutions are often associated with high transaction costs and an increased, 
weak contact enforcement, corruption and risk for long term trade commitments. 
 A similar view by Hall & Jones (1999) pointed that overall productivity of 
factors of production in a country is driven by the quality of its institutions. Good 
quality institutions enhance the ability of a country to adopt new technologies 
invented elsewhere which may play an important role in upgrading the 
development process of a country (Bernard & Jones, 1996). Acemoglu & Robinson 
(2010) argue that institutions are the fundamental determinant of economic growth 
and cause development differences across countries. 
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 The main argument regarding institutional theory is that, institutions strongly 
influence human behaviour and therefore have a strong relevance for the growth 
and development of countries (or lack thereof) (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012). 
While there is no universally accepted definition of institutions, a broad consensus 
has been reached on what constitutes institutions and what their principal functions 
and effects are (for a comprehensive overview see Hodgson, 1998; and 
Williamson, 2000). Following North (1991; 1992), institutions are interpreted as 
‘humanly devised constraints that structure political, economic, and social 
interactions. They constitute the framework of a society, which to a high degree 
determines the individuals’ activities by providing crucial information and 
therefore reducing uncertainty (Voigt, 2002).  
 
2.2. Empirical studies 
Several empirical studies have been undertaken to explore the linkage between 
institutional quality and long term economic growth. The relevant economic 
literature remains divided over the precise nature of this interlinkage. However, 
these studies suffer from qualitative nature of institutional variables, measurement 
problem of the variables reliability and subjectivity of data. 
The central hypothesis of empirical research into the impact of the quality of 
institutions on economic development is that institutions that guarantee political 
and civil freedoms and rule of law are necessary for economic development 
(Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012). Both institutions and governance structures are 
important for understanding the path of economic growth and why some countries 
have been more successful than others in building market-compatible institutions 
(Beck & Laeven, 2005). In a similar line of reasoning, Pande & Udry (2005) 
proved that long-run growth is faster in countries that have higher quality 
contracting institutions, better law enforcement, increased protection of private 
property rights, improved central government bureaucracy, smoother operating 
formal sector financial markets, increased levels of democracy, and higher levels of 
trust.  
Betancourt & Bensyishay (2010) recently showed a link between institutions 
and growth through the direct role of civil liberties and level of economic activity. 
They took data from Freedom House and disaggregated the civil liberties index and 
found that the sub category related to property rights institutions explains long term 
economic growth very well. Again, Kormendi & Meguira (1985) studied the 
impact of institutions on economic performance of nations. In their study they 
examined the effect of civil and political liberties, among other factors, on 
economic growth and investment for 47 countries during the period from 1950 to 
1977. The result shows that countries that have high level of liberties are most 
successful.  
One of the influential studies that highlight the importance of institutions in 
relation to economic growth, while correcting for endogeinety problems, is by 
Acemoglu et al., (2001). In this study a case for differences in economic 
institutions as the ‘fundamental cause of different patterns of economic growth was 
considered. They introduced settler mortality’s as an instrument variable to deal 
with the issue of endogeneity. Their results showed that institutions in fact had a 
large impact on economic growth, while geography did not matter (at least not in a 
direct way). An important critique of this study is that the instrument used is not 
universally applicable, because not all poor countries were colonized.  
According to Acemoglu & Robinson, (2012) institutional quality is pivotal for 
economic development. There is much evidence that democratic institutions, the 
absence of corruption, rule of law, and sound governance structures in the 
country’s administration are conducive to promoting growth in terms of Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP), or to attracting foreign direct investment (FDI), to 
mention just some of its most relevant determinants. Democratic governance and 
accountability are not the end point after a country has undergone economic and 
social development, but rather the start point of a more sustainable development.To 
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emphasize, Grogan & Moers (2001) have found that the institutions had much 
importance for FDI and economic growth. Causation existed between growth and 
institutions. In FDI and institutions, the degree of causation was low. 
Heckelman et al., (2008) have developed a theoretical model and an empirical 
evaluation of the link between institutions, corruption and economic growth. Their 
theoretical model highlights a range of possible equilibrium configurations in the 
relationship between corruption, growth and institutional quality. According to 
them, corruption has a negative impact on growth in a regime with high 
institutional quality but has no impact if institutional quality is poor. Conversely, 
Zhuang et al., (2010) highlight the role of institutions and governance in enhancing 
economic progress. The study emphasizes the measurement of institutional quality 
and its impact on economic performance. The results of the study indicate two way 
long run relations between institutional quality and economic performance.  
Previous studies on the relationship between institutional quality and economic 
growth are yet not conclusive. This is due to the institutional variables chosen, the 
group of countries in the analysis, and the time period of the study, the results are 
mixed. This study uses six world governance indicators (WGI) as measures of 
institutional quality which are provided by the World Bank. 
 
3. Methodology and data 
3.1. Data 
This study utilises panel data from secondary data source. The annual time 
series data have been collected for the period from 1996 to 2015 for five countries 
including Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda. The data for gross 
domestic product (GDP), population growth, gross fixed capital formation, human 
capital, and inflation have been obtained from World development indicators 
(WDI). On the other hand, data for different indicators of institutions have been 
collected from Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) as per Kaufman, et al.  
(2010).  
 
3.2. Model Specification 
The relationships between variables have been quantified using powerful tools 
of econometrics. In order explore the relationship between institutions and 
economic growth, the following empirical model was estimated: 
 
ln k kit it it it
k
Y Inst control        
 
 
Where,  ln itY   is the log of GDP per capita in country i at period t, itInst  is a 
set of measures of institutional quality,  k
itcontrol  is a vector of k other explanatory 
variables, it  is the error term, and ( 
k ) is a vector of parameters to be 
estimated.  
3.2.1. Definition and Measurement of variables 
GDP is a dependent variable and refers to the logarithm of real Gross Domestic 
Product per capita. Other traditional determinants of economic growth are included 
in the regression as control variables. The choice of these variables is based on 
numerous previous growth theories (see for example Barro, 1991).  Inflation (INF) 
is used as a control variable and is proxed as annual change in percentage point of 
consumer price index (CPI). In an economy, high inflation is a sign of 
macroeconomic imbalances and reduces economic growth. Gross fixed capital 
formation (GCF) is used as a proxy for the ratio of investment to GDP. A positive 
coefficient is expected as greater investment is related to positive effect on growth 
(Mankiw et al., 1992). Human capital (HUC) refers to measure of economic value 
of an employees’ skill set. Human capital is also considered to be the major 
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determinant of economic growth in endogenous growth theories advanced by 
Romer (1986, 1990) and Lucas (1988). We use the proxy of the net secondary ratio 
to represent the level of participation in the education system and literate 
rate.Population growth (POP) is an increase in the number of people that reside in a 
state or a country. We use the annual percentage growth rate of a country’s 
population as a proxy for population growth. 
In order to measure institutional quality, governance indicators provided by the 
World Bank are used and comprise six different indicators. These indicators are 
based on some opinion and perception-based surveys of various governance 
measures from investment consulting firms, non-government organizations, think 
tanks, governments, and multilateral agencies; they are classified as voice and 
accountability (VOA), rule of law (RUL), control of corruption (COC), regulatory 
quality (REQ), political stability (POS) and government effectiveness (GOE). In 
order to capture institutional quality we utilize six governance indicators pertaining 
to the seminal work by Kaufmann et al., (2005). The indicators take the values 
ranging from -2.5 to 2.5 inclusive, with an increase consistently implying better 
quality of institutions.  
3.2.2. Regression Models 
The standard panel regression models of fixed effect (FE) and random effect 
(RE) is used for estimation. FE assumes that something within the individual 
country, firm or company may impact or bias the predictor or outcome variables 
and this need to be controlled. This is the rationale behind the assumption of the 
correlation between entity’s error term and predictor variables. FE removes the 
effect of those time-invariant characteristics so that the net effect of the predictors 
on the outcome variable can be assessed. In addition, time-invariant characteristics 
are unique to the individual and should not be correlated with other individual 
characteristics. Each entity is different, therefore the entity’s error term and the 
constant (which captures individual characteristics) should not be correlated with 
the others.  
Unlike fixed effects model, random effects assume that variation across entities 
is random and uncorrelated with the predictor or independent variables included in 
the model. However, the hausman test is used to decide on the appropriate model 
between fixed effect and random effect model. The hausman test therefore tests the 
null hypothesis that random effects iu and itx are uncorrelated. If random effects 
and regressors are uncorrelated, then we estimate random effects model. On the 
other hand if they are correlated, the fixed effects model would be appropriate. If 
the Hausman statistic is smaller than its critical value then we fail to reject the null 
hypothesis that regressors and random effects are uncorrelated. 
 
4. Empirical Analysis and findings 
4.1. Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 and 2 show summary descriptive statistics and pairwise correlations 
respectively. A number of variables for institutional quality have been used as well 
as other control variables for the regression as shown in the table below. 
 
 Table 1. Summary statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Real GDP 100 22.99 1.17 21.07 24.68 
VOA 100 25.68 12.28 3.8 44.71 
POS 100 17.70 12.53 0.48 47.87 
GEF 100 30.69 14.03 2.93 57.35 
REQ 100 34.95 15.68 4.41 61.54 
RUL 100 27.59 14.96 2.39 61.06 
COC 100 24.31 17.07 1.42 76.92 
POP 100 3.00 0.95 1.36 7.99 
GCF 100 20.18 6.66 2.78 33.24 
HUC 100 0.37 0.95 0.18 0.51 
INF 100 8.70 5.94 -2.41 31.11 
Source: Authors 
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Table 2. Pairwise correlation 
 GDP POS GEF REQ RUL COC VOA POP GCF HUC INF 
GDP 1           
POS 0.386 1          
GEF 0.248 0.576 1         
REQ 0.287 0.629 0.478 1        
RUL 0.412 0.715 0.444 0.754 1       
COC 0.247 0.251 -0.164 0.648 0.608 1      
VOA 0.273 0.475 0.815 0.452 0.645 0.748 1     
POP -0.035 0.143 -0.047 0.185 -0.153 -0.181 -0.183 1    
GCF 0.736 0.357 0.569 0.575 0.415 0.444 0.604 0.266 1   
HUC 0.632 0.305 0.644 0.367 0.649 0.765 0.523 0.141 0.781 1  
INF -0.096 -0.246 0.016 -0.095 -0.302 -0.267 -0.256 -0.089 -0.102 -0.149 1 
Source: Authors’ computations 
 
The summary statistics show data collected from five countries for the period 
covered from 1996 to 2015 resulting to 100 observations of a balanced panel. 
According to table 1, the values of standard deviations which measure the extent of 
dispersion indicate that the data are fairly spread from the mean. The values of 
minimum and maximum are also relatively close to the mean suggesting that there 
are no outliers. 
Pairwise correlation as indicated in Table 2 show that GDP is positively related 
to political stability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, 
human capital, gross fixed capital formation, control of corruption, and voice and 
accountability as expected. In addition, GDP is negatively related to inflation as we 
also expected. However, population growth is negatively related to GDP. This 
relation was not anticipated. Among institutional variables rule of law is the most 
highly correlated with GDP while the least variable is control of corruption. 
 
4.2. Empirical results 
In our estimation, we use GDP as a dependent variable and six governance 
indicators as per Kaufmann, (2005) as explanatory variables. However, we also use 
other control variables as used in other previous studies. 
The Fixed Effects estimation has been used after performing the Hausman test 
and find is significant, then we reject the null hypothesis that Random Effects 
model is appropriate (see Table 3). 
 
Table 3. Fixed effects estimates (Dependent variable GDP) 
Variable Coefficient Standard error t-value P-value 
VOA 0.0021239 0.0034121 0.62 0.535 
POS 0.0054344 0.0030171 1.80 0.075 
GEF -0.0117473 0.0030179 -3.89 0.000 
REQ -0.0041746 0.0029058 -1.44 0.154 
RUL 0.0098502 0.0030041 3.28 0.002 
COC 0.0047736 0.0026041 1.83 0.070 
POP -0.0267998 0.0213849 -1.25 0.214 
GCF -0.0044087 0.0050693 -0.87 0.387 
HUC 3.983653 0.5279983 7.54 0.000 
INFL -0.000925 0.002768 -0.33 0.739 
C 21.63942 .137887 156.94 0.000 
Notes: R2 = 0.843. F –Statistics 45.67 (0.000) 
 
The regression results in Table 3 above show that all institutional variables 
except government effectiveness (GEF) and regulatory quality (REQ) have positive 
effect on economic growth. Political stability (POS) and control of corruption 
(COC) are positive and statistically significant at 10 percent level, implying that 
good political environment coupled with democracy, peace and stability in the 
country as well as lack of corruption provides better environment and enhances 
economic growth. Similarly, Rule of law (RUL) and government effectiveness 
(GEF) are statistically significant at 5 percent level of significance. This implies 
that strong legal system and rule of law have a great role to play in promoting 
economic growth and development. Again, government effectiveness is relevant 
for enhancing growth. Other control variables are not significant except human 
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capital which is statistically significant at 5 percent level of significance. Human 
capital has a coefficient of 3.983 showing a higher contribution to the real gross 
domestic product (GDP) as compared to other variables. The R – squared is 0.843 
indicating that 84.3 percent of the variation in GDP is explained by independent 
variables. Only 15.7 percent of the variation in GDP is explained by other factors 
not included in the regression model. 
 
5. Conclusion 
The overall objective of this study was to examine the relationship between 
institutional quality and economic growth in five east African countries namely; 
Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda. In order to achieve our objective 
we applied six governance indicators as proposed by Kaufmann, (1996). We used 
panel regression models of FE and RE in our estimation. Our findings show that 
political stability, rule of law, government effectiveness and control of corruption 
are significant variables to explain economic growth in East African countries. On 
the other hand regulatory quality and voice and accountability are insignificant 
variables. This result is consistent with other studies (see Acemoglu & Robinson, 
2012; Barro, 1996; Zhuang et al., 2010). 
On the basis of our findings, institutions are crucial in achieving the 
development process due to its influence on economic growth. In this case 
governments should undergo reforms and formulation of good policies required for 
better allocation of resources. Additionally, governments should abide to the rule 
of law through established strong courts responsible for enforcement of contracts 
and protection of property rights.  Furthermore, control of corruption is important 
to ensure that public powers are not exercised for private gains. On top of that, 
governments have to maintain political stability, peace and security so that 
economic activities can be carried out peacefully. Decision makers have to ensure 
that policies in place work towards maintaining democracy, minimizing corruption 
and ensuring rule of law. This can lead to efficient and good institutions for 
sustainable economic development. 
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